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Public performances have assumed critical importance in military hostilities
that remains true today1 with warfare fought both in geophysical places
and across varied textual, broadcast or internet media.2 This dynamic has
garnered strategic attention among militaries and scholars alike since the

* © 2020 Prof. Dr. Nikolas M. Rajkovic. Chair of International Law, Department
of Public Law and Governance, Tilburg University (The Netherlands). I am grateful
for the feedback given on earlier drafts by Tanja Aalberts, Jason Beckett, Gleider Hernandez,
Sofia Stolk, Renske Vos, and Wouter Werner.
1. PAUL VIRILIO, WAR AND CINEMA: THE LOGISTICS OF PERCEPTION 7 (Patrick Camiller
trans., Verso 2009).
2. See MICHAEL DILLON & JULIAN REID, THE LIBERAL WAY OF WAR: KILLING TO
MAKE LIFE LIVE 108–12 (Routledge, 2009).
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First Gulf War and its acknowledged made-for-TV quality.3 Further, the
world’s most powerful militaries have become renowned for t heir
preoccupation with “winning” kinetic battles as well as with conquering
the narrative portrayal of hostilities.4 The famous military axiom of
controlling the high-ground has expanded beyond topographical geography5
to include the narrative heights of conflicts. 6 The so-called “mission
accomplishment” requires mastery over two essential and interactive
confrontations: kinetic and narrative hostilities.7
While many have written on related notions of “virtuous war,”8 the “global
battlefield”9 or “everywhere war,”10 these approaches have focused largely
on: (a) the heightened prominence and implications of asymmetric warfare;
and (b) how different technologies and infrastructures are produced to
enact what Derek Gregory has coined “death from a distance.”11 Military
conflicts have evolved from singular battlefields to a matrix of battlespaces,
involving multiple sites and dimensions of kinetic and narrative combat.12
Correspondingly, the model “theatre of hostilities” has expanded its scope
regarding spaces, actors and actants,13 leaving scholars of international

3. James Der Derian, Virtuous War/Virtual Theory, 76 INT’L AFF. 771, 772 (2000).
4. Patrick T. Jackson & Ronald R. Krebs, Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The
Power of Political Rhetoric, 13 EUR. J. OF INT’L REL. 35 (2007).
5. See MICHAEL HOWARD, WAR AND THE LIBERAL CONSCIENCE 128 (Rutgers Univ.
Press, 1978).
6. See generally R ONALD R. K REBS, NARRATIVE AND THE M AKING OF U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY (2015) (analyzing how dominant narratives become dominant and
their influence in the U.S. national security debate); see also Amanda Alexander, The “Good
War”:Preparations for a War against Civilians, 15 L., CULTURE AND THE HUM. 227, 229
(2019).
7. Ami Ayalon, Elad Popovich & Moran Yarchi, From Warfare to Imagefare:
How States Should Manage Asymmetric Conflicts with Extensive Media Coverage, 28(2)
TERRORISM AND POL. VIOLENCE 254, 256 (2016).
8. See generally JAMES DER DERIAN, VIRTUOUS WAR: MAPPING THE MILITARYINDUSTRIAL MEDIA-ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK (2009) (building upon the existing literature to
discuss the use of new technologies in these “new wars,” characterized by “virtual”
enemies).
9. See generally Noam Lubell & Nathan Derejko, A Global Battlefield? Drones
and the Geographical Scope of Armed Conflict, 11 J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST. 65, 65–66 (2013)
(discussing the evolution of the geographic scope of war towards a global battlefield).
10. See Derek Gregory, The everywhere war, 177 THE GEOGRAPHICAL J. 238 (2011).
11. Derek Gregory, From a View to a Kill: Drones and Late Modern War, 28
THEORY, CULTURE AND SOC’Y 188, 192 (2011).
12. David Kennedy, Modern War and Modern Law, 12 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 55, 74
(2006).
13. See DAVID KILCULLEN, OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS: THE COMING AGE OF THE URBAN
GUERRILLA 43–44 (2013).
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security and international law struggling to keep pace with the pronounced
institutional changes.14
This Article explores the extent of the change by looking at the ways in
which asymmetric conflict and legalization have reshaped the theatre of
hostilities and the implications for the institution of war itself.15 The shift
from one literal battlefield to multiple and disaggregated battlespaces has
led to a reconfigured theatre of hostilities,16 which now involves a complex
mix of local and global spaces as well as kinetic and narrative forms of
combat.17 This re-making of armed hostilities in geographical, material,
and social terms has increased access to the drama, stage, and audience of
military theatres. Further, the more globalized and publicized character of
hostilities has allowed a higher number of actors, and actors of higher
quality, to participate in and observe hostilities, whether kinetic, narrative,
or both.18 This has given a powerful platform for law to mediate the
conduct of warfare, and it is thus unsurprising that the notion of legality
regularly occupies center stage in a reconstructed theatre of hostilities.19
Accordingly, military actors, whether state or non-state, are producing
performances of legality in combat to influence not only their adversaries
but also, crucially, formal and informal judgments across the theatre’s
more expansive and global audience. The term “performances” does not
imply cynical theatrics, but rather concerted actions to display legality or
illegality as an integral part of warfare. In this way, such performances of
legality have become a crucial strategic asset for interacting kinetic and
narrative confrontations.20 This has led to a distinctive struggle between
adversaries over appearances of legality and illegality, which has produced

14. See Charles Garraway, ‘To Kill or Not to Kill?’—Dimensions on the Use of Force,
14 J. OF CONFLICT & SEC. L. 500, 501 (2010).
15. See generally Emily Crawford, From Inter-state and Symmetric to Intra-state
and Asymmetric, 17 Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 95 (2014) (examining the changing
methods of warfare throughout the 20th century and discussing the changes in law to
respond these changes).
16. Frederic Megret, War and the Vanishing Battlefield, 9 LOY. CHI. U. INT’L L. REV.
131, 132–33 (2011–2012).
17. Michael John-Hopkins, Mapping War, Peace and Terrorism in the Global Information
Environment, 8 J. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 202, 204–08 (2017).
18. Ayalon et al., supra note 7.
19. See e.g., Nikolas M. Rajkovic, Tanja Aalberts & Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen,
Introduction: Legality, Interdisciplinarity, and the Study of Practices, in THE POWER OF
LEGALITY: PRACTICES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THEIR POLITICS 1, 3 (2016).
20. John-Hopkins, supra note 17, at 213.
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an institutional and narrative battlespace of growing importance that this
Article conceptualizes as vicarious litigation.
The Article is organized in five sections. Section I introduces and
elaborates on the related notions of legal performances and vicarious
litigation by bridging sociological theorizing on social performances with
noted developments in asymmetric warfare. This conceptual effort draws
insight from Performative Sociology21 and the so-called “practice turn” in
international relations theory.22 Section II describes the origin of vicarious
litigation as flowing from the asymmetric warfare’s disruption of the
institutional bargain behind modern war and, consequently, International
Humanitarian Law (IHL). To understand that institutional disruption,
Section II discusses Andrew Mack’s under-examined inquiry into and
conceptualization of “asymmetric conflict.”23 Sections III and IV look at
how international lawyers, and specifically IHL scholars, have struggled
to grasp the rise of asymmetric conflict and how the dominant “lawfare”
literature has suffered from conceptual straining and the incapacity to
theorize institutional change precipitated by the prevalence of asymmetric
conflict. Section V focuses on the novel notions of legal performances and
vicarious litigation and examines how these novel notions provide alternatives
to the hobbled semantics of lawfare by offering greater insight into institutional
mutations that now define the legalization of contemporary warfare.
I. A RECONFIGURED THEATRE OF HOSTILITIES: LEGAL
PERFORMANCES AND VICARIOUS LITIGATION
Since 2008, a series of Gazan wars have involved the entry of Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) into Gaza for the stated purpose of degrading Hamas
militarily.24 While each Gazan war represents a discrete and episodic
military event, this Article argues that this specific sequence of war has
produced a consistent and signature model of combat. The regularity and
feedback loops of such wars led one scholar to refer to Palestine-Israel

21. See generally JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER, PERFORMANCE AND POWER (2011) (building
upon the theory of social performance to analyze how performativity can help studying
politics and society); see also Jeffrey Alexander et al. eds., SOCIAL P ERFORMANCE :
SYMBOLIC ACTION, CULTURAL PRAGMATICS, AND RITUAL (2006) (describing a new theory
of social performance).
22. Emmanuel Adler &Vincent Pouliot, International Practices, 3 INT’L THEORIES
1 (2011) (“approach[ing] world politics through the lens of its manifold practices . . . define[d]
as competent performances.”).
23. See Section II, infra (discussing how Mack theorized the concept of asymmetric
conflict).
24. Jim Zanotti et al., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40101, ISRAEL AND HAMAS: CONFLICT
IN GAZA 2008-2009 2(2009).
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confrontations as a kind of military “laboratory.”25 This signature model
gains empirical shape by looking at what a prominent international
newspaper reported in an instance of asymmetric combat during Operation
Cast Lead.26 An account and mapping of the combat maneuverers made
by each adversary is described below.
The IDF identified a multi-level residential building (building) used by
Hamas allegedly for military purposes. The IDF then classified the Building
as one having a military objective, and consequently it became an airstrike
target. The IDF obtained telephone numbers of some known residents of
the Building, and it sent automated voice and text messages—in local Arabic
—warning of an imminent attack and instructing them to immediately
evacuate. Hamas intercepted those warnings and immediately responded
by sending a crack team of civilian-looking militants and supporters to the
roof of the Building, so as to complicate the mission for the IDF pilot
assigned to the air strike. The appearance of civilians on the roof visibly
constituted an invocation of the prohibition against harming civilians
under the Geneva Convention. However, the military pilot responded by
launching (or dropping) a specially-designed fake ordinance on the roof,
which did not explode.27 The fake ordinance scared away, warned, and
effectively dispersed those civilian-looking individuals on the roof top,28
and thus cleared the pilot’s view as well as the view from the onboard
video camera. The tactic facilitated a later strike on the building, this time
using an actual explosive ordinance.
This scenario is not a random instance but rather an example of a larger
structural change in the contemporary theatre of hostilities.29 It illustrates
how a hybrid model of combat has evolved,30 where legality assumes
a foreground, as opposed to a background, position in combat strategy and

25. ORDE KITTRIE, LAWFARE: LAW AS A WEAPON OF WAR 197 (Oxford Univ. Press,
2016).
26. Steven Erlanger, Both Sides in Gaza War Using Lethal New Tricks, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 1, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/world/africa/11iht-tactics.1.19248753.html?
searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/N323-FSDJ].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Derek Gregory, War and Peace, 35 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS
154, 155–56 (2010).
30. Robert Wilkie, Hybrid Warfare: Something Old, Not Something New, 23 AIR &
SPACE POWER J. 13, 14 (2009).
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tactics exercised by adversaries.31 The scenario also exemplifies the nexus
between military strategy and IHL.32 This Article further contends that this
interconnection is characterized by a pattern of struggles exceeding the
popular characterization of “lawfare” as the use or misuse of law to achieve
a military objective.33 Indeed, warring actors are doing something more
institutionally and sociologically than using or misusing law: they produce
performances of legality as an integrated feature of the military theatre,
and this has engendered a new litigious space of institutional and narrative
combat encapsulated, described in this Article as vicarious litigation.
To understand the value of vicarious litigation, it is important to first
grasp what legal performances are and how such practices now reconfigure
the contemporary theatre of hostilities. This brings us to two key questions:
(1) What does “legal performances” mean? (2) How do competing legal
performances produce vicarious litigation as a new battlespace of narrative
combat? First, the emphasis on legal performances draws, in part, from a
history of legalistic discourse and rights-based activism that international
lawyers already know. Since at least the 1970s, human rights and humanitarian
norms have been used by state and non-state actors to reshape the international
system by promoting greater civil and social rights, war crimes accountability
and even corporate responsibility.34 Public advocacy campaigns have
exposed these efforts, labelled by Keck and Sikkink as “naming and shaming”
strategies, or the “boomerang effect”: the strategy consists in pressuring
targeted actors to comply with varied kinds of normative obligations.35
Moreover, the legality of warfare has evolved considerably beyond these
initial and groundbreaking models based on interactions between adversaries,
as well as with activists. The way that powerful militaries have also
harnessed the influence of legal performances,36 and thus appearances, in
the characterization of specific hostilities,37 is an important factor of change
31. Pascal Vennesson & Nikolas M. Rajkovic, The Transnational Politics of Warfare
Accountability: Human Rights Watch versus the Israel Defense Forces, 26 INT’L REL. 409,
412 (2012).
32. Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account
of International Law Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (2010).
33. Charles J. Dunlap, Does Lawfare Need an Apologia, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 121, 122 (2010).
34. Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (1998) (arguing
that transnational advocacy networks use human rights to create international change); see
also Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, & Kathryn Sikkink, THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (1999) (describing the socialization process
where human rights norms influence state actors); Sanjeev Khagram, James V, Riker & Kathryn
Sikkink (eds.), Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Movements, Networks, and
Norms (2002).
35. Keck & Sikkink, supra note 34, at 12.
36. Dickinson, supra note 32.
37. Vennesson & Rajkovic, supra note 31, at 410–12.
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and constitutes an institutional transformation. Then-NATO commander
General James Jones, in remarks that have since gained particular fame
among IHL scholars, captured this transformation:
It used to be a simple thing to fight a battle . . . In a perfect world, a general would
get up and say, “Follow me, men,” and everybody would say, “Aye, sir” and run
off. But that’s not the world anymore, . . .[now] you have to have a lawyer or
a dozen. It’s become very legalistic and very complex.38

Since Jones’ remarks, the scale and impact of legalization upon warfare
has continued to spread further: state, non-state, and activist entities have
all “lawyered up”39 in different ways and become skilled and adept in enacting
legal performances with convincing effects. The current strategic, legal,
and communications environment in which it is difficult for any single
actor to outright command the legal characterization of hostilities,40
especially in a political time dominated by social media and the influences
of so-called “fake news,”41 is a result of these changes,
International lawyers have spent little time theorizing such strategic
interactions and their institutionalizing effects—where warring adversaries
effectively litigate legal appearances, and thus, weaponize not merely
black-letter law but appearances of legality within real-time combat.42 the
recent growth in the “lawfare” literature provides some insight into that
profound change, but that represents only a partial window to how legal
performances have institutionalized a vicarious litigation space within
active hostilities. In other words, real-time combat often involves simultaneous
kinetic and litigious dimensions, where legal performances are strategically
integral to a more complex theatre of hostilities.43
Analyzing “legal performances” both conceptually and with respect to
concrete implications for contemporary warfare deepens the understanding
of that profound change. Conceptually, legal performances should be
understood as patterned actions directed at an organized context and the

38. Charles J. Dunlap, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, YALE J. OF INT’L AFF. 146, 146
(2008).
39. E.g., Steve Keeva, Lawyers in the War Room, 77 AM. B. ASS’N J. 52, 59 (1991).
40. See Vennesson & Rajkovic, supra note 31, at 422.
41. See Bjornstjern Baade, Fake News and International Law, 29 EUR. J. OF INT’L
L. 1357 (2019).
42. See Zoltan Buzas, Evading International Law: How Agents Comply with the Letter
of the Law but Violate its Purpose, 23 EUR. J. OF INT’L REL. 4 (2016).
43. See, e.g., Safia Swimelar, Deploying Images of Enemy Bodies: US Image Warfare
and Strategic Narratives, 11 MEDIA, WAR & CONFLICT 179, 179–80 (2018).
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wider public; the aim is to construct appearances of lawfulness.44 The
chief goal is to build social resonance, recognition, and ultimately to obtain
validation from a global audience of legal experts, public opinion, and
sovereign decision-makers.45 To attain that outcome, such performances
appeal to recognized legal interpretations and standards, so as to portray
obligation, competence, and imperative compliance.46 Further, what makes
legal performances consequential, and thus strategically powerful, is their
discursive coerciveness. For instance, a military actor produces a compelling
legal performance during hostilities, e.g., the kinds illustrated earlier by
the IDF or Hamas, mobilizing a powerful rhetorical frame that frustrates an
adversary’s ability to provide “socially sustainable rebuttals.”47 Therefore,
competent legal performances generate an impetus where warring adversaries
identify and value norms of international law as war-fighting assets, leading
to their incorporation within an integrated and dynamic strategy of kinetic
and narrative (counter)attack.48
However, this evolution in narrative combat continues to mutate. Most
warring adversaries now fight with, or know of, the proverbial legal
performances “playbook.”49 This new normal has diminished the firstmover advantage some actors, mostly insurgent, had enjoyed with legal
performances in real-time combat.50 As such, warring actors, whether state
or non-state, frequently enact legal performances in active hostilities, so
as to shape public interpretations of events and impact the material capacities
of their rivals.51 These consistent and ritualized practices have formed a
litigious battlespace where actors vicariously sue and counter-sue each
other across textual, broadcast, or internet media.52 What results is a continuous
public barrage of legal performances and interpretations, aimed at a global
matrix of legal experts, activist groups (e.g., Human Rights Watch), and
para-judicial entities (e.g., UN commissions and human rights rapporteurs),
to build broader legal backing for a warring adversary.53
The net impact of this increasingly ritualized struggle is both rhetorical
and material; it also expands the actual theatre of hostilities whenever
44. ADLER & POULIOT, supra note 22, at 7.
45. Rajkovic et al., Legality, Interdisciplinarity and the Study of Practices, supra note
19, at 19–20.
46. Vennesson & Rajkovic, supra note 31, at 412.
47. Jackson & Krebs, supra note 4, at 42.
48. See Daniel Mann, “I am Spartacus”: Individualising visual media and warfare,
41 MEDIA, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 39–40 (2019).
49. David Kennedy, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIANISM 235–37 (2004).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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powerful states are engaged in combat. Consequently the so-called “mission
accomplishment” becomes more complex because a litigious battlespace
enables more actors and actants to enter into the narrative, and possibly
kinetic combat.54 There is a quantitative and qualitative enlargement of
the audience that may appraise combat conducted.55 Further, the drama of
vicarious litigation readily occupies center stage, because its adversarial
process attracts widespread public attention and thus influences which actor
may claim superior legality to leverage an adversary in combat. The resulting
pivotal non-kinetic struggle is the form of legal logistics encountered in
present-day warfare: military actors must vicariously litigate in order to
sustain, influence, or augment their kinetic maneuvers on the geographic
terrains of confrontation.56 Put starkly, a compelling YouTube video, exposing
an episode of potential grave illegality in combat, could have material
consequences similar to an actual ambush of armed forces during live-fire
hostilities.57 This example underscores how war and its interactions, as
Lieutenant-General Paul Van Piper explains, became a contest decided by
far more than simply kinetic confrontation:
Technology permeates every aspects of war, but the science of war cannot
account for the dynamic interaction of the physical and moral elements that come
into play, by design or by change, in combat. War will remain predominantly an
art, infused with human will, creativity, and judgment.58

Re-envisioning the theatre of hostilities, therefore, focuses on a broader and
multi-dimensional model of kinetic and narrative combat—which pays
attention to the salience of legal performances and the clash of their competing
productions. Defining legality in light of contemporary warfare requires
deeper investigation into the wider theatre of actors, spectators, and actants
that struggle over, socially and juridically, when a combatant is or is not
in a perceived state of legal conformity. The outcomes of vicarious litigation
are shaped by the public struggles between coalitions of actors, of differing
capabilities, each intent upon realizing and validating specific characterizations
54. Charles Dunlap Jr., Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st-Century Conflicts, 54
JOINT FORCES QUARTERLY 34, 35 (2009).
55. See Sebastian Kaempf, The Mediatisation of War in a Transforming Global
Media Landscape, 67 AUSTL. J. OF INT’L AFF. 586, 592 (2013).
56. See Neve Gordon, Human Rights as a Security Threat: Lawfare and the Campaign
against Human Rights NGOs, 48 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 311, 326 (2014).
57. See JAN MIESZKOWSKI, WATCHING WAR 232 (2012).
58. Paul K. Van Riper, Information Superiority, MARINE CORPS GAZETTE (June 1,
1997), https://mca-marines.org/gazette/information-superiority/ [https://perma.cc/MLM7-LTMX].
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of legality in combat over competing frames and possibilities.59 Public
struggles with major strategic importance because the notion of legality is
used to influence public perceptions of correct military intervention and
conduct. Legality, in this more dynamic context, becomes less about
demonstrating blackletter compliance with IHL and more about how rival
legal performances seek to impose governing appearances of illegality or
lawfulness.60 Ultimately, a meta-war of words and narratives becomes
enacted through different types of vicarious litigation operating integrally
with military operations.
II. ORIGINS OF VICARIOUS LITIGATION: ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT
AND WAR’S DISRUPTED BARGAIN
The notable rise of vicarious litigation probably falls among what some
scholars have described as a crisis afflicting the core “bargain” behind
IHL.61 The notion of bargain refers to how prominent regimes in international
law, e.g., the United Nations Charter or the World Trade Organization,
are based on key actors agreeing upon essential assumptions of norms and
rules that govern the applicable institutional framework.62 Similarly, IHL
is no different. IHL’s underlying bargain has centered pivotally on battlefield
victory as the universal aim of warring parties. The resulting bargain
compromised between military necessity and the protection of human life,
where the right to kill gains legal sanction whenever performed for military
advantage and, crucially, victory.63 However, compromising human life,
in recent times, has shown signs of fraying from what seems a decisively
new strategic context. Nicolas Lamp explains:
The understanding of IHL as a compromise between the interests of the warring
parties and humanitarian concerns is at the heart of IHL’s traditional paradigm . . . .
This understanding, however, is . . . based on the ‘old’ conception of war. When
the aim of military victory ceases to be the only or even primary motivation for
fighting, as is often the case in the ‘new wars’, the fundamental principles of IHL
change their character in terms of their factual relevance for the conduct of war
(the principle of proportionality), their compatibility with the interests of the

59. See Pascal Vennesson, War Under Transnational Surveillance: Framing Ambiguity
and the Politics of Shame, 40 REV. INT’L STUD. 30, 34–35 (2014).
60. See Roger Stahl, What the Drone Saw: The Cultural Optics of the Unmanned
War, 67 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 654, 659–60 (2013)
61. See Ian Clark, Sebastian Kaempf, Christian Reus-Smit & Emily Tannock, Crisis in
the Laws of War? Beyond Compliance and Effectiveness, 24 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 319, 321
(2017).
62. Id. at 330.
63. See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International
Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 796–98 (2010).
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warring parties (the principle of distinction), and thus their sustainability to serve
as the foundations of a legal system that relies on voluntary compliance.64

Within this dynamic, the notion of vicarious litigation strengthens because
it is a parcel of a larger institutional transformation surrounding warfare.
Explaining the novel strategic logic driving change, and its implication
for the historical assumption and bargain behind IHL, are important to
understand the new strategy. For international lawyers, this requires a
foregrounding of recent military history and five decades of wars spanning
from Algeria to Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Gaza. These conflicts are
often lumped under the generic label of “asymmetric warfare,”65 with the
term representing a loose empirical marker for much scholarship across
International Law and International Relations (IR). More recently, the
term “asymmetric warfare” has also been applied to so-called counter-insurgency
groups or “war on terror” campaigns conducted in, for example, Afghanistan,
Iraq, or Somalia.66
Yet, when one further investigates into the adjective and its origin,
asymmetric warfare is the stem of a prior analytical concept—“asymmetric
conflict”. In the mid-1970s political scientist Andrew Mack developed the
concept of asymmetric conflict to theorize a remarkable pattern of military
defeats inflicted on French and American forces in North Africa and
Southeast Asia.67 Correspondingly, Mack conceptualized asymmetric conflict
to explain how states with overwhelmingly superior military forces lose
wars in places like Algeria and Vietnam.68 Put differently, militaries so
capable of battlefield victories managed to consistently lose wars of vital
interest because of asymmetric conflict.69
64. Nicolas Lamp, Conceptions of War and Paradigms of Compliance: The ‘New
War’ Challenge to International Humanitarian Law, 16 J. CONFLICT AND SECURITY L. 225,
243 (2011).
65. E.g., Michael Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian
Law, 62 A.F. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008); Eyal Benvenisti, The Law of Asymmetric Warfare, in
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL
REISMAN 931; James R. Orr, Counterinsurgency Law: New Directions in Asymmetric Warfare,
19 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 763, 763 (2013); see also Ryder McKeown, Legal Asymmetries
in Asymmetric War, 41 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 117 (2015).
66. Benjamin Lockes, Bad Guys Know What Works: Asymmetric Warfare in the Third
Offset, TEXAS NAT’L SECURITY REVIEW (June 23, 2015), https://warontherocks.com/2015/
06/bad-guys-know-what-works-asymmetric-warfare-and-the-third-offset/.
67. See Andrew Mack, Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric
Conflict, 27 WORLD POL. 175, 175 (1975).
68. See id. at 175–76 (1975).
69. See id.
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For Mack, asymmetric conflict does not derive from examining how
military superiority was misapplied, but from understanding: (1) a radical
change in how certain actors (state and non-state) view the nature and
purpose of military violence; and (2) how those conceptions diverged
from the established paradigm of war’s purpose and aim.70 The ensuing
gaps became exploited by allegedly inferior insurgents to produce a
remarkable pattern of military outcomes.71 Accordingly, Mack’s concept
and theory of asymmetric conflict offers an explanation resolving how
these historical defeats derived less from conventional military factors than
from accurately illustrated fundamental change to the core assumption that
defined the modern institution of war—battlefield victory.72 To understand
this change’s foreseeable implications on the underlying premise and
bargain behind the IHL regime, looking at what Mack revealed in terms
of the larger strategic and, ultimately, normative impacts of asymmetric
conflict as an increasingly prevalent genre of war helps.
Mack’s distinction between asymmetric and symmetric conflicts is a
radically altered structure of confrontation. Profound differences in “resource
power” between the superior military actor and the materially weaker insurgent
actor73 and the inability of insurgents to deliver a direct threat, e.g., by
launching a conventional military attack or invasion against the superior
military foe are the two key factors to define asymmetric conflict.74 The
implication is a unique strategic setting with different logics of “victory”
for each of the asymmetric belligerents.75 From the superior military actor’s
perspective, the theatre of hostilities became extended into public and
domestic politics, because “a war with no visible payoff against an opponent
who poses no direct threat will come under increasing criticism as . . . costs
escalate.”76 From the insurgent actor’s perspective, in contrast, military
violence was the purpose, with its new, extended opportunity to negate
the thrust of conventional military superiority. As Mack explained:
Lacking the technological capacity or the basic resources to destroy the external
enemy’s military capability, [insurgents] must [sic] of necessity aim to destroy
his political capability. If the external power’s “will” to continue the struggle is
destroyed, then its military capability—no matter how powerful—is totally
irrelevant. . . .
To paraphrase Clausewitz, politics may become the continuation of war by other
means. Therefore [sic] the military struggle on the ground must be evaluated not
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
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in terms of the narrow calculus of military tactics, but in terms of its political
impact in the metropolis: “Battles and campaigns are amenable to analysis as
rather self-contained contests of military power . . . . By contrast, the final outcome of
wars depends on a much wider range of factors, many of them highly elusive—
such as the war’s impact on domestic politics.”77

In sum, what Mack brought to light was a vastly different teleology that
asymmetric conflicts induce. This flowed from how “winning” in the
asymmetric context required a complex mix of both military and political
victories. In other words, strategy became less about destroying military
capability and more about undermining an adversary’s political capability
and will to wage war. Mack’s quote of Henry Kissinger on the Vietnam
War emphasized this shift: “[The United States] fought a military war; our
opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents
aimed for our psychological exhaustion.”78 Accordingly, the change in purpose
and strategy invoked a novel methodology, which prioritized political
attrition over military attrition and the imperative to inflict a “steady
accumulation of ‘costs’” against the adversary.79 This emphasis on political
attrition required an understanding of how unconventional “victories” could
be obtained, even through situations of military stalemate or defeat since
the social significance of battles and hostilities went beyond their outcome
as “self-contained contests of military power.”80 As Mack illustrated, political
over simply military impact became essential in asymmetric conflicts:
the aim of insurgents is not the destruction of the military capability of their
opponents as an end in itself. To attempt such a strategy would be lunatic for a
small Third-World power facing a major industrial power. Direct costs become
of strategic importance when, and only when, they are translated into indirect
costs. These are psychological and political; their objective is to amplify the
“contradictions in the enemy’s camp.81

III. LAMENT AND INDIGNATION: NEW WARS, LAWFARE AND IHL’S
NARRATIVE STRUGGLE WITH ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT
The shift from battlefield victory to infliction of political costs had
wide-ranging implications, extending beyond military strategy into the broader
institutional and normative practice of war, with the scale of implication later
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 179–80.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 184–86.
Id. at 185.
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reaching and entering the purview of IHL scholarship, albeit considerably
after political science. Yet, what distinguishes that legal literature on
asymmetric conflict are distinct postures that this Article characterizes as
lament versus indignation. The former variant manifests as a sub-literature
on so-called “New Wars,” and the latter variant produces a very extensive
and influential scholarship on lawfare.
This section considers whether those respective postures, and their related
sub-literatures, have missed a deeper institutional mutation incurred by
asymmetric conflicts, which the author’s review of Mack’s work attempts
to make visible. In other words, have lament and indignation across the
IHL literature distracted from a richer conceptual and legal observation
vis-à-vis the conduct of asymmetric hostilities? Have existing narratives
deployed by international lawyers come at the price of obscuring a novel
institutionalization that flows out of vicarious litigation? To address such
questions, some mapping is useful on the sub-literatures, and their perceptions
of asymmetric conflict and its institutional impacts. This involves sketching
key assertions made across each branch of scholarship. Notably, what
unites both sub-literatures are a register of crisis, yet each perception is driven
by different logics of consequence and visions of remedy.
The “New Wars” scholarship (NWS), driven by eminent scholars like
Antonio Cassesse82 and Cherif Bassiouni,83 presents asymmetric conflict
as a radical development posing a profound compliance dilemma.84 The
NWS frames the emergence of asymmetric conflict as an external challenger
for IHL’s established rules, producing architectural upheaval because
“almost all modern armed conflicts are asymmetric.”85 Correspondingly,
asymmetrical conflict is portrayed as an usurping warfare, where “asymmetry
compels [insurgent actors] to resort to unconventional and unlawful means
and methods of warfare as the only way to redress the military and economic
imbalance they face.”86 Furthermore, structural collision is the overriding
characterization since the interests of insurgent actors are theorized as
incompatible with how military necessity is presumed under the law of
82. Antonio Cassesse, Current Challenges to International Humanitarian Law in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 4–19 (Andrew
Clapham et al. eds., 2014).
83. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law
of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. OF CRIM. LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 711–810
(2008).
84. See George R. Lucas Jr., “New Rules for New Wars” International Law and
Just Wart Doctrine for Irregular War, 43 CASE W. RES. J. OF INT’L L. 677, 702 (2011); see
also Miriam Bradley, International Humanitarian Law, Non-State Armed Groups and the
International Committee of the Red Cross in Colombia, 4 J. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL
STUD. 108, 131 (2013).
85. CASSESE, supra note 82, at 8.
86. BASSIOUNI, supra note 83, at 714–15.
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armed conflict. The outlook advanced, therefore, is one of historic predicament,
fueled by a dominant view that “lacunae” in IHL leave insurgent actors
outside the institutional framework, and thus incentivize others to undermine
the established laws of war. As illustrated by the United Nations SecretaryGeneral, this has cultivated institutional lament over the perceived gap
between the existing institutional order and the prevalence of asymmetric
conflicts: “[i]mproved compliance with international humanitarian law
and human rights law will always remain a distant prospect in the absence
of, and absent acceptance of the need for, systematic and consistent engagement
with non-state armed groups.”87
The lawfare scholarship, by contrast, has developed an alternate narrative
that emphasizes how asymmetric conflicts represent an internal, and not
external, challenge for IHL’s institutional framework. Accordingly, instead
of doctrinal lacunae and architectural crisis, the focus is on legally-savvy
actors, e.g., insurgents, and how they are instrumentalizing—or even gaming
—the established laws of war.88 This flows from a systemic confluence
of asymmetric conflict with legalization, which has generated novel military
practices that use and abuse the IHL framework. Yet, lawfare scholarship
is fragmented on the ramifications of law’s infusion into asymmetric
conflicts, being divided largely between two conceptual approaches that
emphasize what scholars have called reflexive89 versus structural90 lawfare.
As a result, a more extensive and wide-ranging scholarship has developed
relative to the NWS, driven by an exceptional interchange between military
and civilian scholars on how to interpret law’s entry into asymmetric warfare
and, correspondingly, sustain IHL’s institutional coherence vis-à-vis the
specter of internal misuse.91
We need to grasp how lawfare emerged as a term, and specifically the
way a conceptual cleavage structures what has become a popular lawfare

87. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in
armed conflict, ¶ 11 U.N. Doc. S/2010/579 (Nov. 11, 2010).
88. See CASSESE, supra note 82, at 1, 7, 10.
89. Wouter G. Werner, The Curious Career of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 61, 68 (2010).
90. Dale Stephens, The Age of Lawfare, 87 INT’L L. STUD. 327, 330 (2011).
91. See, e.g., Andres B. Munoz Mosquera & Sacha Dov Bachmann, Lawfare in
Hybrid Wars: The 21st Century Warfare, 7 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 63 (2016);
Michael T. Palmer & J. Michael Johnson, Undersea Lawfare: Can the U.S. Navy Fall
Victim to This Asymmetric Warfare Threat?, 69 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 135 (2016); Michael
A. Newton, Illustrating Illegitimate Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 255 (2010);
William A. Schabas, Gaza, Goldstone and Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 307 (2010).
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sub-literature. Pivotally, the term lawfare did not originate from scholarship,
rather it entered academic vocabulary via the United States Air Force and,
specifically, via the office of the Judge Advocate General (JAG).92 The
term was popularized at the turn of the millennium by Major General
Charles J. Dunlap in a series of speeches and writings, where, in Dunlap’s
words, he advanced: “a ‘bumper sticker’ term easily understood by a variety
of audiences to describe how law was altering warfare.”93 This “bumper
sticker” strategy proved wildly successful because it came to dominate
both societal and scholarly discourses. To illustrate the semantic impact,
for instance, consider the is instructive: a search today of lawfare generates
over 900,000 returns in Google,94 over sixty academic articles or chapters
in Thompson Reuters Web of Science,95 a Wikipedia definition,96 a highly
prolific Lawfare blog,97 but, remarkably, no entry in the Oxford English
Dictionary.98 As Sadat and Geng explain, lawfare is distinguished by a
remarkable paradox, where its rhetorical omnipresence is equaled by a
commensurate lack of etymological meaning:
Analyzing the terms reveals that ‘law’ is defined as ‘a rule of conduct imposed
by authority’ while ‘fare’ is an Old English, now archaic, word meaning a voyage
or expedition. Thus, ‘herring-fare’ would be an obsolete way of referring to a ‘voyage
to catch herrings.’ In the same vein, ‘warfare means going to war . . . the action of
carrying on, or engaging in, war.’ Using this method, ‘lawfare’ would indicate a
voyage into law. However, the term is probably more accurately described as a play
on the word ‘warfare.’99

This bit of etymological history becomes relevant for more than your next
game of Scrabble.100 Specifically, sizable conceptual stretching was involved
when lawfare jumped from “bumper sticker” to a term of art within
international law scholarship. It merits asking whether international lawyers
were attentive to the consequences of that jump, where, effectively, a play
on words became a conceptual framework for an influential scholarship
92. Freya Irani, ‘Lawfare’, US military discourse, and the colonial constitution of
law and war, 3 EUR. J. INT’L SECURITY 113, 113 (2017).
93. Dunlap, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, supra note 38, at 146.
94. GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (search “lawfare” to retrieve “About 1,460,000
results”) (last visited Feb. 26, 2020).
95. WEB OF SCIENCE, www.webofknowledge.com (search “lawfare” to retrieve 61
results) (last visited June 12, 2019).
96. Lawfare, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawfare (last visited Feb.
26, 2020).
97. LAWFARE BLOG – HARD NATIONAL SECURITY CHOICE, https://www.lawfareblog.com
[https://perma.cc/7DCU-FNAW] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
98. Leila Nadya Sadat & Jing Geng, On Legal Subterfuge and the So-Called
Lawfare Debate, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 153, 156 (2010).
99. Id.
100. William A. Schabas, Gaza, Goldstone, and Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 307, 308 (2010).
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of IHL. This becomes significant when one understands what Giovanni
Sartori, another political scientist, identified as the tendency toward
“conceptual straining” across the social sciences.101 As Sartori explains,
reliance on highly abstract terms, like lawfare, risk over-extension in relation
to empirical developments because, “the net result of conceptual straining
is that our gains in extensional coverage tend to be matched by losses in
connotative precision. It appears that we can cover more—in travelling
terms—only by saying less, and by saying less in a far less precise manner.”102
Why is “conceptual straining” relevant vis-a-vis lawfare in scholarly
analyses? The implication is more apparent when one looks closer at the
two dominant strands of reflexive and structural lawfare. This loops us
back to the founding posture of indignation from which lawfare emerged
as a concept and stimulated an eventual reflexive scholarship. The term
sprung, literally, into popularity via indignation, which Major-General
Dunlap openly acknowledged as the rationale behind his initial promotion
of lawfare as a “bumper sticker.”103 This was illustrated in Dunlap’s landmark
paper presented at Harvard’s Carr Center for Human Rights in 2001, where
lawfare was first described as a term expressing military indignation as
well as a policy in pursuit of some legal scholarship:
Lawfare describes a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing
a military objective. Though at first blush one might assume lawfare would result
in less suffering in war (and sometimes does), in practice it too often produces
behaviors that jeopardize the protection of the truly innocent. There are many
dimensions to lawfare, but the one ever more frequently embraced by U.S.
opponents is a cynical manipulation of the rule of law and the humanitarian values
it represents. Rather than seeking battlefield victories, per se, challengers try to
destroy the will to fight by undermining public support that is indispensable when
democracies like the U.S. conduct military interventions. A principle way of bringing
about that end is to make it appear that the U.S. is waging war in violation of the
letter or spirit of LOAC.104

101. Giovanni Sartori, Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics, 64 THE AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1033, 1034 (1970).
102. Id. at 1035.
103. Dunlap, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, supra note 38, at 146.
104. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian
Values in 21st Century Conflicts, Paper Presented to the Humanitarian Challenges
in Military Intervention Conference 4, 11 (Nov. 29, 2001) [hereinafter Dunlap, Law and
Military Interventions].
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IV. CONCEPTUAL STRAINING AND THE LIMITS OF LAWFARE
The scholarly traction Dunlap gained following that proverbial launch
at Harvard was near immediate and well-documented, giving rise to an
initial generation of lawfare work that emphasized its instrumentality and
bad faith.105 Notably, at the vanguard was a hyper-instrumental and pejorative
type of theorizing, which, as Dunlap echoes above, mirrored the political
logic of attrition as elaborated by Mack to political scientists three decades
earlier.106
But within IHL, reflexive lawfare made no reference to Mack’s theorizing
on asymmetric conflict; instead, its theory of naked instrumentalism was
developed by a separate cohort of legal academics and advocates107 led by
Harvard scholar and one-time Bush administration advisor, Jack Goldsmith:
“various nations, NGO’s, academics, international organizations, and others
in the international community have been busily weaving a web of international
and judicial institutions that today threatens [United States government]
interests.”108
Yet, the academic life of lawfare has been richer than this opening and
influential generation of reflexive scholarship. This explains why Dunlap’s
later work migrated to a different conceptualization of structural lawfare.
The scholarly purpose behind that shift is less of a focus on alleged misuses
of law, and instead a focus on making “sense of the changing security
environment in which militaries—primarily Western—had to operate.”109
Dunlap’s migration reflects a turn in research to less ideological theorizing,
as exemplified by David Kennedy’s work on lawfare that examined both
positive and negative implications flowing from IHL’s “routinization” in
contemporary warfare.110 There was general recognition that warring state
and non-state actors all use law to serve strategic purposes, which suggested
the need for “managing law and war together.”111 As Dunlap expressed in

105. See, e.g., Eric Talbot Jensen, Combatant Status: It is Time for Intermediate Levels
of Recognition for Partial Compliance, 46 VA. J. OF INT’L L. 209, 210 (2005) (discussing
Dunlap’s paper).
106. Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions, supra note 104, at 11.
107. See Alan Dershowitz & Elizabeth Samson, The Chilling Effect of ‘Lawfare’
Litigation, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 9 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
libertycentral/2010/feb/09/libel-reform-radical-islamic-groups [https://perma.cc/736N-UTPF];
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., NAT’L DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5
(2005); Matthew S. Cohen & Chuck D. Freilich, War By Other Means: the Delegitimization
Campaign Against Israel, 24 ISRAEL AFF. 1, 10–14 (2018).
108. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 60 (2009).
109. Werner, supra note 89, at 66.
110. See DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 41 (2006).
111. See id. at 125.
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retrospect, lawfare had evolved from a vocabulary of normative disapproval to
a managerial and critical discourse on the implications of war’s legalization:
Although I’ve tinkered with the definition over the years, I now define “lawfare”
as the strategy of using—and misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military
means to achieve an operational objective. As such, I view law in this context much
the same as a weapon. It is a means that can be used for good and bad purposes . . . .
Today’s international commerce requires an extensive legal architecture to function,
and this fact operates to raise the “legal consciousness”, so to speak, of the entire
world community. As we have seen before, such trends in global affairs tend to
spill over into warfare.112

However, several questions arise. Did Dunlap overstate lawfare’s actual
renovation? To what extent had a narrative makeover mitigated the legacy
of indignation, and retooled lawfare’s analysis on the “extensive legal
architecture” behind contemporary war? These questions push Sartori’s
earlier quote back into focus on the problem of abstraction and conceptual
strain in the social sciences, with lawfare being a case in point. The onetime bumper sticker had travelled far within legal and especially IHL
scholarship and flowed from semantics of “saying less in a far less precise
manner.”113 The notable gain of lawfare convened a fragmented scholarship,
involving both hyper-instrumental and critical clusters of literature. Yet,
this left a sizable portion of IHL’s scholarship on asymmetric conflict that
is analytically vulnerable because institutional analysis was boxed within
a play on words.114 With scholars hooked on the semantics of lawfare, nearly
every development regarding law and asymmetric conflict could be reduced
into some variant of lawfare. This overuse and strain effectively stunted
vocabulary and analytical insights into evolving institutional dynamics
between law and asymmetric conflict. As Dunlap illustrated in his preceding
quote, lawfare was expressed as law being a “weapon” but later tied to a
wider legal “architecture”115 without theorizing the relationship and simultaneity
between those diverse meanings.
Consequently, novel terms like legal performances and vicarious litigation
represent important means of conceptual leverage useful for confronting
lawfare’s semantic success via a mirror of conceptual poverty. This requires
piecing together what both Mack and Dunlap have revealed (to different
disciplinary audiences) on the mutations grafted by asymmetric conflict
112.
113.
114.
115.

Dunlap, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, supra note 38, at 146.
See Sartori, supra note 101, at 1035.
Sadat & Geng, supra note 99, at 156.
Dunlap, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, supra note 38, at 146–47.
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onto the established laws of wars. In this light, both NWS and lawfare
literature missed a key observation due to their dominant postures of
lament and indignation. Asymmetric conflicts have produced institutional
mutations to the existing framework of IHL, which are neither exclusively
external or internal to the IHL system of rules.116 The strategic emphasis
on political attrition over battlefield victory radically expanded possibilities of
unconventional combat victories, which have made legal appearances—
as opposed to military outcomes—a major dimension in often globalized
theatres of armed hostilities.
The problem is that the theorizing of lawfare lacks conceptual depth to
translate the extent of institutional change. Foremost, there are fundamental
gaps vis-à-vis the kinds of power lawfare articulates and theorizes, and
specifically, what value-added the concept provides to understand the
dynamics of institutional power in asymmetric conflicts. The significance
of that gap becomes clearer with Barnett and Duvall’s explanation of
compulsory versus institutional power:
. . .[I]nstitutional power is an actors’ control of others in indirect ways.
Specifically, the conceptual focus here is on the formal and informal institutions
that mediate between A and B, as A, working through the rules and procedures
that define those institutions guides, steers, and constrains the actions (and nonactions)
and conditions of existence of others.
Thus compulsory and institutional power differ in the following ways . . . .
[C]ompulsory power typically rests on the resources that are deployed by A to
exercise power directly over B, A cannot necessarily be said to “possess” the
institution that constrains and shapes B . . . . [R]are is the institution that is completely
dominated by one actor.117

This definition highlights the void incurred by lawfare’s attempt to strain
around the concept of institutional power. We can even see that straining
at work when lawfare is, to use Dunlap’s term, tinkered into “managing”
law’s interventions in asymmetric conflicts,118 or investigating IHL’s
“routinization” in contemporary warfare. A deeper look at institutional
power points to how lawfare’s semantics have distracted from theorizing
law’s use relative to different forms of power in asymmetric conflicts and
warfare. The question that follows, conceptually, is how to move past
lawfare’s notional grip?
There is a signpost, this Article argues, standing already within Dunlap’s
revised definition of lawfare: “the strategy of using—or misusing—law as a

116. See Section 3: Lament and Indignation: New Wars, Lawfare and IHL’s narrative
struggle with Asymmetric Conflict, supra at 15.
117. Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall, Power in International Politics, 59 INT’L
ORG. 39, 51 (2005).
118. Dunlap, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, supra note 38, at 146.
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substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational
objective.”119 Few have examined Dunlap’s definition to evaluate how he
theorizes power, and still fewer have placed his definition relative to
Barnett and Duvall’s distinction between compulsory and institutional
power. In doing so, what sticks out is the way Dunlap’s definition relies,
explicitly, on a compulsory rather than an institutional theory of power.120
This is curious. First, law and IHL have an inherent institutional quality.
Second, lawfare originated from indignation over the (alleged) institutional
misuse of law to further extra-legal objectives.121 Third, Dunlap’s definition
operates presumably in a relational context, where warring adversaries use
or misuse law interactively against each other to achieve a military objective.122
Thus, translated into the language of Barnett and Duvall above, each adversary
attempts to leverage institutional power, via the rules and procedures of
IHL, in order to influence “the actions (and nonactions)” of their opponents.123
V. CONCLUSION: VICARIOUS LITIGATION AS A NOVEL
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND BATTLESPACE
This is where legal performances and vicarious litigation re-enter the
picture as better conceptual means for accessing that contest over law’s
institutional power in warfare. Warring parties each seek to mobilize, in
different ways, the institutional rules of IHL. However, to call that simply
“lawfare” and end the analysis there would let too much of the institutional
struggle escape from view. In particular, we lose sight of the major
institutional, or quasi-institutional, contest at play: state and non-actors
enact legal performances to construct compelling appearances of legality,
or illegality, within the theatre of hostilities. The big challenge, as Barnett
and Duvall underline, is that no state or non-state actor physically, or
normatively, possesses an international institution, like IHL, as its own.
Rather, there is only a “rare” possibility of dominating the institution,124
by knowing how to direct an institutional apparatus versus an adversary
with like intentions and skills.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Dunlap, Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?, supra note 33, at 122.
Barnett & Duvall, supra note 117, at 51–52.
See Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions, supra note 104, at 4.
Dunlap, Does Lawfare Need an Apologia?, supra note 33, at 122.
Barnett & Duvall, supra note 117, at 51.
Id.

455

RAJKOVIC (DO NOT DELETE)

6/5/2020 4:47 PM

Accordingly, the crowning metaphor behind lawfare’s scholarship, i.e.
law as a physical “weapon”, becomes misleading, because it ignores how
IHL operates as an institutional, rather than simply compulsory, means of
power in asymmetric conflicts. This helps explain the notable rise of legal
performances because warring actors seek to mobilize the institutional
authority of IHL by broadcasting vicarious legal claims and counterclaims.
Each adversary seeks to discursively and legally master IHL as an institutional
and indirect means of waging (narrative) combat. And the nature of that
struggle intensifies as more actors see legal performances as a useful means
of institutional power, political attrition and, crucially, indirect control.
The end result for today’s theatre of hostilities is that vicarious litigation
has become an integral battlespace and a novel institutional mutation of
IHL’s framework, that works influentially between kinetic and narrative
combat. Yet, there is a darker implication to this distinctive outgrowth of
legalization. Vicarious litigation can readily escalate into a vortex of militarized
legalism with no actual court for resolution, which, while proliferating
references to legality, paradoxically disables the institutional coherence,
authority and power of IHL in real-time combat. The legalization of war
along such an institutional trajectory translates into a different kind of
normative conquest, which deviates from what international lawyers likely
presumed with law’s active integration into present-day warfare: legal
performances and vicarious litigation as institutional extensions of combat
by other means.
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